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efficiency. Building on the experimental paradigm of multi-level public good games and the 
‘neighborhood attachment’ concept, we conduct an artefactual field experiment with 600 
participants in a setting conducive to parochial behavior. In an inter-neighborhood intra-
region design, subjects allocate an endowment between a personal account, a local, and a 
regional public good account. The between-subjects design varies across two dimensions: 
One informs subjects that the smaller local group consists of members from their own 
neighborhood (‘neighbors’). The other varies the relative productivity at the two public goods 
provision levels. We find evidence for parochialism, but contrary to our hypothesis, 
parochialism does not interfere with efficiency: The average subject responds to a change in 
relative productivities at the local and regional level in the same way, whether aware of their 
neighbors’ presence in the small group or not. The results even hold for subjects with above-
median neighborhood attachment and subjects primed on neighborhood attachment. 
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1. Introduction 
Public goods (PG) can be provided at different spatial levels. As a result, individuals often 
have to make a decision not just whether to contribute to PG, but how much to contribute at 
different levels: Should I contribute to wildlife conservation through donating to a 
conservation area in my neighborhood when I could also contribute to wildlife conservation 
through a regional wildlife initiative? Should I give more support to my local public radio 
station – or more to the national network? In the ‘level problem’, individuals need to come to 
a decision whether and how much to contribute at different levels, each involving groups of 
different size and differently sized benefits of contributing for others – and for oneself.  
The multi-level public goods game (ML-PGG) is an extension of the standard PGG that 
experimental economists have been employing for some time now in order to understand 
more about individual behavior in the level problem (Wachsman 2002, Wit and Kerr 2002, 
Blackwell and McKee 2003, Buchan et al. 2009, Güth and Sääksvuori 2012, Fellner and 
Lünser 2014, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016).1 While design details differ, the unifying 
feature of all ML-PGG is the nested structure of social dilemmas: Subjects can privately 
provide the PG in a smaller group at the lower level and in a larger group at the upper level, 
and all the smaller groups are fully contained within a larger group. This nested structure is 
what differentiates the ML-PGG from other extensions of the standard PGG to multiple PGs 
(e.g. Cherry and Dickinson 2008, Falk et al. 2013, McCarter et al. 2014)2 and what allows the 
level problem to be captured by design.  
To the public economist, the ML-PGG offers an opportunity to re-examine the behavioral 
economics of the level problem. The behavioral phenomenon at the heart of the present paper 
is the possibility that individuals exhibit a narrow concern for their own local group in the 
level problem, attaching a consequently lower weight to outcomes for the larger group in 
which the local group is nested. Such parochial concerns could interfere with the efficiency of 
individuals’ contribution decisions across the different levels in major ways, in particular if 
the provision of public goods technically exhibits economies of scale over some relevant 
range. Such scale economies are a regular feature of public goods such as education 
                                                 
1 More recently, the ML-PGG has also been applied in quantitative biology to study the evolution of cooperation 
(Wang et al. 2011). 
2 ML-PGG designs so far capture the concurrence of PG dilemmas in two different ways. One set of designs 
involves an allocation tasks for an experimental endowment not just between a private and a single group 
account, but between a private and two group accounts that differ in group size, marginal per-capita return, and 
other structural features (Blackwell and McKee 2003, Buchan et al. 2009, Fellner and Lünser 2014, Chakravarty 
and Fonseca 2016). The other set of designs retains the standard allocation task between one private and one 
public account, but varies across treatments the externalities that the public account generates to different groups 
(Engel and Rockenbach 2009, Güth and Sääksvuori 2012). 
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(Brasington 2003), municipal services (Reingewertz 2012), fire (Duncombe and Yinger 1993) 
and police services (Finney 1997) and are commonly captured in ML-PGG by higher 
aggregate returns to contributing to spatially higher levels. The implication is that ‘leveling 
up’, i.e. more contributions going to the higher provision level, is in the interest of social 
efficiency (Buchan et al. 2009, Güth and Sääksvuori 2012, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016) 
and that behavioral mechanisms that impede ‘leveling up’ impose a social cost. Parochialism, 
the object of our present study, is an obvious candidate for such a mechanism.  
The study of parochialism, i.e. favoring one’s own group at the expense of efficiencies in the 
larger group, relates to the recent interest in economics in individuals’ social identity or sense 
of group attachment (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Such attachment has been shown to have 
significant impact on contribution decisions in the standard PGG when the design allows 
group attachment to play a role. When subjects share a social identity through a group, they 
tend to behave more cooperatively, than on average, towards those they recognize as group 
members and less cooperatively towards outsiders. Evidence for such in-group favoritism and 
out-group discrimination can sometimes be generated in standard PGGs in which the shared 
commonalities in the group are ‘minimal’ (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Bernhard et al. 2006, 
Chen and Li 2009)3 and most reliably in settings in which the shared social identity is 
naturally grown through direct social interaction (e.g. Charness et al. 2007, Goette et al. 2006) 
and in which it can lead to potentially significant efficiency losses (e.g. Bernhard et al. 2006, 
Ruffle and Sosis, 2006). Our study of parochial behavior in the ML-PGG shares with the 
existing literature on group attachment a focus on in-group favoritism, but also differs 
because the nested architecture of the ML-PGG does not admit an out-group. Instead, it 
features several in-groups of different size and distance to the contributor. In such a setting, 
social identity very well might, but need not necessarily affect PG contributions and create a 
conflict between parochialism and efficiency.  
In the present paper, we build on previous ML-PGG experiments with an allocation task 
between a personal account, a local public good account, and a regional public good account 
in order to investigate the presence and magnitude of the ‘leveling up’ effect. We do so in the 
setting of an artefactual field experiment4 that is naturally suited for parochialism to manifest 
itself and at the same time allows for a controlled variation of both the relative productivities 
of PG provision at different levels and of the awareness of a shared group attachment in the 
small (low level) group. The ideal setting for parochialism to assert itself is one in which 
                                                 
3 ‘Minimal’ groups are defined by a group identity constructed around an arbitrary membership criterion, such as 
assignment of a color or a shared taste in art (Turner et al. 1979).  
4 We follow the nomenclature of Harrison and List (2007) in this characterization. 
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individuals exhibit attachment to naturally grown groups at a local level, but not at a higher 
level. The experiment implements this setting by offering a choice of providing the PG at two 
levels, the local level being the neighborhood in which the subject lives and the regional level 
being the region in which the subjects’ neighborhoods are all located. The affiliation of an 
individual to a neighborhood has a distinguished history in the literature as an identifier of 
attachment to a naturally grown group. Neighborhood affiliation is a well-established 
component of social identity in social psychology and sociology. Intensively studied for at 
least forty years (see Lewicka 2011 for a survey), neighborhood attachment correlates with 
other measures of ‘local social capital’, the intensity of neighborhood ties, and the level of 
involvement of subjects in informal social activities in the neighborhood (Ringel and 
Finkelstein 1991, Moser et al. 2002, Bonaiuto et al. 2003, Brown et al. 2003, Lewicka 2005). 
Correspondingly, the neighborhood has since been used in economics as an appropriate level 
at which to investigate parochialism in trust relationships (Falk and Zehnder 2013, Meier et 
al. 2016), PG provision (Marschall 2004), and social dilemmas in general (Falk et al. 2013). 
Neighborhood affiliation is also a particularly meaningful concept in the present context 
because of the explicitly spatial nature of the ML-PG provision problem in our experimental 
implementation. Numerous PGs are provided at the neighborhood level because the 
neighborhoods in our experiment, municipal districts in German cities, are political entities 
that have their own neighborhood associations, their own physical infrastructure of social 
interaction such as community halls, and send their own delegates to the city council. The 
neighborhood therefore provides a direct connection to public decision-making in the real 
world. Attachment to one’s neighborhood contrasts with that to one’s region, the other level 
of PG provision implemented in our experiment. Emotional attachment to regions is generally 
weak (Lewicka 2011) because regions are considered by their inhabitants to be more abstract 
(Tuan 1975), spatially fuzzy (Laczko 2005), and often a product of government planning 
rather than historically grown (Paasi 2003). All of these characteristics apply to the region that 
is used as the higher provision level in our present experiment, providing the desirable 
differential in attachment compared to the neighborhood level.  
The controlled variation of the awareness of shared group attachment comes from two 
treatment conditions, one in which subjects learn that the small group contains only members 
of the subject’s own neighborhood and the other in which they do not. The controlled 
variation in the relative productivities of PG provision at the local and regional level comes 
from two treatments that differ in the marginal per-capital return (MPCR) of the regional PG. 
Together with the recourse to naturally grown groups, this two-by-two design allows us to 
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answer whether parochialism interferes with greater efficiency in ML social dilemmas. This 
gives rise to three distinct contributions: The first is the exogenous variation of a naturally 
grown social identity, thereby going beyond minimal (Blackwell and McKee 2003, 
Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016) and anonymous groups (Fellner and Lünser 2014) and 
experiments without exogenous variation in place attachment (Buchan et al. 2009). The 
second is a design that answers to the need for a randomized assignment of subjects to 
treatments in which both the salience of social identity and the relative contribution 
productivities in the ML-PGG differ. This allows a clean disentangling of the social identity 
dimension and the efficiency dimension, which is not possible on the basis of existing 
evidence. Such disentangling is required, however, in order to isolate whether social identity 
and efficiency (MPCR) interact negatively. Earlier experiments either vary the MPCR of one 
of the two PGs (Blackwell and McKee 2003, Fellner and Lünser 2014, Chakravarty and 
Fonseca 2016), vary the salience of the group affiliation at a constant MPCR (Chakravarty 
and Fonseca 2016), or examine home-grown variations in group affiliation (Buchan et al. 
2009). None implements the full factorial design with randomized assignment that is required 
to test whether groups with a shared social identity at the local level respond less to changes 
in the MPCR than those without a shared social identity.  
The results presented in this paper are based on data collected in an artefactual field 
experiment of the ML-PGG type in which over 600 participants decide online about the 
private provision of concurrent and perfectly substitutable public goods at two different 
levels. Our experimental results are threefold: First, we show that some of the effects of social 
identity generated in lab-based ML-PGG experiments successfully transfer to our field 
setting. Our results reaffirm the previous finding (Blackwell and McKee 2003, Fellner and 
Lünser 2014, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016) that the level-wise allocation of private 
contributions to different PG levels is socially inefficient: Average contributions to the small 
group are positive even when the large group PG generates higher total benefits. We also 
reaffirm the MPCR effect in ML-PGG of previous studies (Blackwell and McKee 2003, 
Fellner and Lünser 2014, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016): Increasing the MPCR of the 
regional PG attracts higher contributions. Secondly, we exploit our factorial design to 
challenge interpretations of previous ML-PGG evidence. We show that it is misleading to 
interpret inefficient level-wise allocations as clear-cut evidence for parochialism. In our 
experiment, inefficient allocations arise irrespective of whether subjects are aware of a shared 
neighborhood affiliation in the smaller group or not. ML-PGGs therefore forego some 
efficiency gains even in the absence of parochialism. Our third and main result is that the 
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strength of the MPCR effect does not vary with the presence of a naturally grown social 
identity in the small group. Comparing groups in which subjects were or were not aware that 
the small group consisted of their local neighbors, we find that both groups increased their 
contributions to the regional PG as the MPCR of the regional PG increased. Importantly, this 
increase is not statistically smaller in the group where neighborhood attachment was made 
public. In other words, a higher efficiency of the regional PG was associated with a leveling 
up of contributions by subjects, and the leveling up was the same across groups, irrespective 
of whether subjects knew that the small group consisted of their neighbors. This finding is 
robust. It holds on average, but also for subjects with above-median neighborhood attachment 
and for subjects that have been procedurally primed on their neighborhood attachment, even 
though both types of subjects exhibit clearly more parochialism in their contributions to the 
smaller group PG than the rest of the population. In our artefactual field experiment, 
therefore, efficiency can be said to survive parochial bias.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental 
design and derives our theoretical predictions. Section 3 contains a detailed description of the 
experimental protocol. We present the experimental results and robustness checks in 
Section 4. The last section provides a summary discussion of our main findings and 
concludes. 
2. Experimental Design & Theoretical Predictions 
2.1. Experimental Design 
Our experimental design implements a multi-level public goods game in which each subject is 
a member both of a small group consisting of four members and of a larger group of eight 
members. The larger group is composed of the small group of four plus an additional four 
members, who are all members of the same other small group. In the parlance of ML-PGG, 
the smaller groups are therefore ‘nested’ (e.g. Güth and Sääksvuori 2012) in the larger group, 
with two small groups of four making up one large group of eight. In keeping with that 
literature, we will repeatedly refer in the paper (but not the instructions) to the small group 
and its PG as local and contrast that with the larger group and its PG being termed regional. 
Figure 1 illustrates the group composition.  
 
 
 
7 
Figure 1: Group composition 
 
The decision task for subjects is to allocate an initial endowment across three different 
accounts: a private account that subjects retain for themselves, a PG that generates benefits to 
the member’s local group only, and a PG that provides benefits to the entire regional group. 
Formally, subject i’s payoff, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖, given the contribution decisions of all remaining seven 
subjects, of which three are in subject i’s local group Li and four in the other local group L-i of 
which i is not a member, can be expressed as 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟  + 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 � 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 
𝑗𝑗∈𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 � 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟 
𝑗𝑗∈𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖∪𝐿𝐿−𝑖𝑖
 
where 𝑒𝑒 denotes the initial endowment, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 the contribution of subject 𝑖𝑖 to the local public 
good, and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 the contribution to the regional public good. 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 is the MPCR from the local 
public good and 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 denotes the MPCR from the regional public good. The respective MPCRs 
fulfill the standard requirements for a social dilemma, with 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 < 1 and 4𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 > 1 for the local 
as well as 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 < 1 and 8𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 > 1 for the regional group. 
The treatment conditions and parametric implementation of the design are summarized in 
Table 1 for stage 1 of the experiment and Figure A1 in the appendix provides a schematic 
diagram of the two-stage procedural implementation plus the number of subjects in each 
treatment. Table 1 shows that the experimental treatments vary along two dimensions, MPCR 
and social identity. We start with the two MPCR conditions that vary the productivity of the 
regional PG. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of these conditions at the outset of the 
experiment and remain in the same MPCR condition until the end. As in Blackwell and 
McKee (2003), there are two MPCRs for the regional good while the MPCR for the local PG 
is always set at 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 = 0.5. The total benefits (TB) of a one unit contribution to the local PG 
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across the entire regional society of eight are therefore held constant at 2 units.5 Condition 
LOW features a regional MPCR of 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 = 0.25 and corresponding TB of 2. In condition LOW, 
therefore, the TB of the local and the regional PG are the same while the price of contributing 
is lower in the local PG.6 Condition HIGH features an MPCR of 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 = 0.5, a corresponding 
TB of 4,which is larger than the TB of the local good, but the same price of contributing.7  
The second treatment dimension, social identity, is implemented in two stages, corresponding 
to two consecutive decision tasks for each subject. In both stages, the treatment consists of 
whether subjects receive information that they share a group attachment with the members of 
the smaller and the larger group. The group attachment for the smaller group is residence in 
the same neighborhood, for the larger it is residence in the same region. The neighborhoods in 
the experiment are municipal districts, i.e. political entities with a typical population of 
several thousand inhabitants and an area of around five square kilometers that elect their own 
representatives to the city council. The region in the experiment is a metropolitan area 
straddling several states with a population of over two million and in which the 
neighborhoods are located. The region does not function as a political entity. In the condition 
LABEL, subjects learn that the small group contains three other individuals that reside in the 
subject’s own neighborhood and that the large group contains those three plus four individuals 
that reside in the same region as the subject. Subjects assigned to the treatment condition 
NOLABEL, on the other hand, are not informed that the three other members of the smaller 
group share a common neighborhood with the subject. Jointly, the two treatment dimensions 
of MPCR and social identity allow us to identify how contributions in a ML-PGG respond to 
naturally occurring forms of social identity.  
 
Table 1: Experimental Design, Stage 1 – Summary 
Treatment Local Public Good (LPG) Regional Public Good (RPG) 
 # αl TBl # αr TBr 
LOW – NOLABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.25 2 
LOW – LABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.25 2 
HIGH – NOLABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.5 4 
HIGH – LABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.5 4 
                                                 
5 With αl = 0.5, a contribution to the local PG of €1 by one subject generates €0.5 for four subjects in the local 
group only and therefore a total benefit of €2 for the entire group of eight.  
6 The price of giving for the individual contributor is the opportunity cost of contributing to the PG. At an MPCR 
of 0.5, the contributor receives €0.5 in PG for every €1, corresponding to a price of €0.5. At an MPCR of 0.25, 
the contributor only receives €0.25 and the price is €0.75.  
7 At  αr = 0.25 (αr = 0.5), a contribution to the regional PG of €1 by one subject generates €0.25 (€0.5) for eight 
subjects in the regional group and therefore a total benefit of €2 (€4) for the entire group of eight.  
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Subjects take one allocation decision in stage 1 of the experimental session. There is no 
feedback after stage 1. The session then continues with stage 2, which is essentially a repeat 
of stage 1, but preceded by a priming task that follows the natural identity stimulation 
approach by Li et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2014). There, subjects first complete a 
questionnaire that contains a set of seven questions about their neighborhood and their 
involvement in neighborhood activities and, second, a short writing task in response to an 
open-ended question. There are two versions of the open-ended question. Given our interest in 
parochial preferences, the analysis of stage 2 decisions uses observations from the majority of 
subjects (74 percent) assigned to the local prime version in which subjects list positive aspects 
of living in their specific neighborhood.8 After completing the writing task, subjects take their 
stage 2 allocation decision. To determine final payoffs to subjects, the group decision of one 
regional group in one of the two stages was randomly selected and the corresponding pay-offs 
computed at the end of the experiment.9 
2.2 Hypotheses  
In a sequence of two one-shot ML-PGG, purely selfish individuals are predicted to allocate 
their entire endowment to their private account in both decisions. Given the parameter choices 
of the design, this prediction holds for all four treatment conditions, irrespective of the level 
of the MPCR (LOW or HIGH) and of the social identity information (LABEL or 
NOLABEL). The behavior of the average subject in PGG experiments, however, is not 
consistent with the assumption of purely selfish preferences (Ledyard 1995, Zelmer 2003, 
Chaudhuri 2011). This also holds for behavior in the ML-PGG for which previous 
experiments have found that individuals exploit the free-riding opportunities present in the 
ML-PGG to a significantly lower degree than predicted in the standard Nash equilibrium of 
purely selfish players (Blackwell and McKee 2003, Güth and Sääksvuori 2012, Fellner and 
Lünser 2014).  
The levels of cooperation observed in the ML-PGG can be traced back to well understood 
structural factors that explain cooperation in the linear PGG such as the MPCR. The 
conclusive evidence from the standard PGG that higher MPCRs induce higher contributions 
(Isaac et al. 1984, Zelmer 2003, Chaudhuri 2011) carries over to ML-PGG. Like in the 
standard PGG, a higher MPCR increases efficiency through a higher productivity and, at the 
same time, a lower price of giving (Andreoni and Miller 2002). Group size, another structural 
                                                 
8 The remaining 26 percent of subjects were assigned to the regional prime version in which they listed positive 
aspects of living in the region. 
9 To prevent spillover or licensing effects, subjects are informed at the beginning of the experiment about these 
procedures.  
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factor, has been shown to have either no or at best a slightly positive effect on contributions in 
experiments involving the standard PGG (Isaac et al. 1994, Nosenzo et al. 2015, Diederich et 
al. 2016). In light of these results, previous findings from the ML-PGG that the small group 
receives higher contributions on average when its TB are the same as those of the larger group 
(Blackwell and McKee 2003, Fellner and Lünser 2014, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016) are 
not in themselves evidence of a local bias, but may simply affirm that contributions in the 
PGG respond to the MPCR, but are largely irresponsive to group size. The finding that 
increasing the MPCRs for contributions to the larger-group PG leads to higher contributions 
(Blackwell and McKee 2003, Fellner and Lünser 2014) is also in line with these previous 
findings. Group size invariance can similarly explain the result that even at identical MPCRs 
for the smaller and larger group, contributions to the smaller group do not fall to zero 
(Blackwell and McKee 2003, Chakravarty and Fonseca 2016).   
Given the broad empirical support for a significant and positive MPCR effect, our first 
hypothesis is that an artefactual field experiment will validate the core findings of previous 
ML-PGG lab experiments. Comparing stage 1 contributions of subjects that face a lower 
MPCR for the regional PG (0.25) than for the local PG (0.5) with stage 1 contributions of 
subjects that face equal MPCRs in both PGs, we predict a higher average share of 
endowments going to the regional PG when MPCRs are the same (and TB are higher). This 
would be in line with the results by Blackwell and McKee (2003) in a design with ‘minimal 
groups’ and by Fellner and Lünser (2014) in a design without group identity and would 
reaffirm the dominance of the MPCR effect: The productivity of contribution to the regional 
public good is higher for the higher MPCR while the price of contribution is lower. Both 
mechanisms render contributing to the regional PG more attractive for subjects with social 
preferences, whether aware or unaware of a shared common identity. Applied to the design of 
the present experiment, this validation test leads to the following formulation. 
Hypothesis 1 (positive MPCR effect): Average contributions to the regional public 
good will be higher in the HIGH MPCR treatment compared to the LOW MPCR 
treatment.  
In other words, contributions are predicted to respond positively to increases in the MPCR for 
a PG benefiting the larger group, and the positive MPCR effect is expected to be present both 
in settings in which subjects are aware of a shared neighborhood affiliation and in which they 
are not. The comparison of contributions that form the core test of hypothesis 1 therefore 
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delivers a validation check on previous findings in the ML-PGG paradigm that have varied 
the MPCR of the regional PG both under anonymity and using minimal groups.  
Following the validation exercise implicit in testing hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 homes in on 
the core issue of this paper: Does a shared social identity in a subgroup of subjects engaged in 
a ML-PG provision problem lead to changes in contribution behavior that can unambiguously 
be judged to interfere with efficiency? In other words, does a parochial bias lead to efficiency 
losses in the level problem and if so, how big are these losses? Our strategy for establishing 
the presence and size of a parochial bias in the present ML-PGG is to examine the interaction 
effect between the shift in the MPCR in the regional good and the disclosure of a shared 
social identity in the local group. This strategy presents a clean test for the question how ML-
PG provision is affected by a potential parochial bias on account of activated social identity 
and is a key step towards the question of efficiency.10 Parochial altruism predicts that, relative 
to subjects in an anonymous setting, subjects aware of a shared local neighborhood affiliation 
attach greater weight to local outcomes (Bernhard et al. 2006) and will therefore have less of 
an inclination to level up in response to a higher MPCR for the regional PG. A shared social 
identity, in other words, prevents subjects’ from leveraging a higher MPCR into a higher 
provision of PGs to the same extent as when identity is not revealed. Applied to the present 
experimental design, this tests formulates as 
Hypothesis 2 (‘leveling up’): The interaction effect between the MPCR treatment and 
the LABEL treatment is predicted to be negative: Relative to subjects without 
knowledge of their group composition, subjects aware that the local public good 
benefits exclusively their neighbors increase the contributions to the higher level by 
less when the MPCR of the regional public good increases. 
The test of hypothesis 2 establishes the core result of our experiment. The remaining three 
hypotheses add robustness. Hypotheses 3 and 4 focus not on the presence of the interaction 
effect, but its strength. We expect to find heterogeneity across subjects in how they respond to 
the disclosure of a common local affiliation among members of the small group. Subjects will 
                                                 
10 An alternative approach could be based on a simple comparison of contribution levels to the local and regional 
PG across social identity treatments at constant MPCR for the regional PG. A strategy based on comparing 
levels across the LABEL/NOLABEL treatment is not sufficient, however. The LOW MPCR treatment is a poor 
setting for a comparison because the TBs of the local and the regional account are identical such that any 
combination of contributions to the local and regional PG that leaves their sum broadly unchanged has the same 
impact on total provision. Comparing levels in the HIGH MPCR treatment, on the other hand, is complicated by 
evidence from previous experiments that even in anonymous group settings, the local PG attract significant 
contributions despite its lower TBs. This sets a high baseline for an additional parochial bias to assert itself. 
Comparing total benefits across MPCRs is also problematic since productivity is exogenously higher in the 
HIGH MPCR condition.  
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be heterogeneous along a multitude of dimensions. The dimension of interest in the present 
design is a predisposition towards parochialism, and we explore two sources of 
predisposition. One predisposition is home-grown: We predict that among subjects who 
articulate a strong attachment to their own neighborhood in the post-questionnaire (henceforth 
‘local patriots’), the change in contributions to the regional PG caused by an increased MPCR 
for the regional good is less than the change among the other subjects when they are in the 
LABEL treatment. No such effect should be present in the NOLABEL treatment. The 
reasoning is the same as that underlying hypothesis 2, with the only difference that subjects 
predisposed to parochialism are expected to exhibit a stronger form of the interaction effect. 
This conjecture is captured in the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3 (local patriots): The negative interaction effect between the MPCR 
treatment and the LABEL treatment is predicted to be greater in absolute terms for 
subjects who articulate high concern for members of their neighborhood compared to 
those who articulate low concern: ‘Local patriots’ that are aware that their contributions 
to the local group benefit their ‘neighbors’ are less inclined than others to ‘level up’ when 
the MPCR of the regional public good increases. 
The second source of predisposition toward parochial choices, namely through priming, 
provides the content of our fourth hypothesis. The priming procedure that subjects take prior 
to their stage 2 decision follows Li et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2014) and is designed to 
activate an existing place attachment in subjects’ mind. Subjects that have undergone the 
local prime version of the procedure and are then assigned to the LABEL condition in the 
social identity treatment are therefore expected to exhibit a stronger concern for how their 
allocation decisions in stage 2 impact on members of the small group. The predictions for 
locally primed subjects are then essentially the same as in the case for a home-grown 
predisposition for parochialism: On average, subjects in the LABEL condition will increase 
their contributions towards the regional PG less as its MPCR doubles than subjects in the 
NOLABEL condition, who are unaware that the small group contains their ‘neighbors’.  
Hypothesis 4 (priming effect): The negative interaction effect between the MPCR 
treatment and the LABEL treatment is predicted to be greater in absolute terms for 
subjects who have undergone the local priming procedure. After local priming, subjects 
that are aware that their contributions to the local group benefit their ‘neighbors’ are less 
inclined than others to ‘level up’ when the MPCR of the regional public good increases. 
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3. Experimental Setting and Procedure 
The inter-neighborhood intra-region experiment recruited participants from a total of four 
municipal districts, two each from two cities in Germany, Heidelberg and Mannheim, that are 
located within 25 km of each other in the same region, the Rhine-Neckar metropolitan region. 
Heidelberg, with a population 150,000, consists of 15 municipal districts; Mannheim, with a 
population of 330,000, consists of 17 districts.  
The recruitment procedure involved the distribution of around 12,000 invitation letters via 
mail to up to 3,000 randomly selected households in each of the four districts.11 The letter 
invited the receiving household to have one member of voting age take part in a scientific 
study on decision making, conducted by the University of Heidelberg and the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. The announced participation reward was 
set at €5. Subjects were informed that they could earn additional individual payments in the 
course of a 15-minute study. No other information on the context of the study was given in 
this initial invitation letter. 
A total of 616 individuals from Heidelberg (323) and Mannheim (293) took part in the online 
experiment. They did so by following a link in the invitation letter with their personal 
electronic device.12 To log in and start the experiment, participants entered an individual 
access code provided in the invitation letter. The access code prevented participants from 
taking part in the study more than once. After going through a series of detailed instructions 
on the procedures, the decision task, and a set of numerical examples, participants made their 
decisions.13 The average participant completed the experiment in approximately 15 minutes. 
We used an ex-post matching protocol to calculate final payoffs.  
The participation payment was set at €5. The initial endowment was set at €8. Participants 
earned an average of €18.38, which at 15 minutes average completion time compares 
favorably with the equivalent average hourly wage. Individual payments were implemented 
by sending households a payment card which is good for cash in many large retail chains, 
petrol stations, and online shops.14 Payment cards were charged with the individualized 
payments and sent out by mail four weeks after the conclusion of the experiment. All 
                                                 
11 Since one district (Bahnstadt) is considerably smaller than the other three districts, we distributed invitation letters to all 
2,000 households living in this district. We provide a translated version of the invitation letter in the supplementary material. 
12 The programming was completed in LimeSurvey, a free open source software tool. The design was optimized for either the 
use of a personal computer, a laptop, a tablet or a smartphone. In addition to the conventional link, the invitation letter 
contained a QR code to facilitate access to the online experiment.  
13 We provide a diagram of the experimental procedures, the invitation letter and a translated version of the instructions in the 
supplementary material. 
14 This procedure allowed us to pay subjects in an incentive compatible way without having to personally interact with them 
which would be problematic both for reasons of anonymity and logistics. 
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specifics regarding the payment procedure were disclosed to subjects prior to their first 
decision. 
As part of the experimental procedure, subjects completed a post-questionnaire after the first 
decision task. The questionnaire collected information on characteristics of place attachment. 
We combine five measures commonly used in the place attachment literature into a score of 
participants’ local identity (local identity index). These metrics are (1) whether participants 
deliberately decided to live in their neighborhood; whether they feel (2) happy, (3) proud, and 
(4) comfortable to be living in their neighborhood; and (5) how well they feel they identify 
with their neighborhood. Responses to each item were made on a five-point Likert scale from 
1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The local identification score was calculated by standardizing 
responses to all five items and summing.15 At the end of the experiment subjects completed 
another questionnaire collection information on core demographics (age, sex, income, 
education, religiousness), duration of residence in the region (years region) and the municipal 
district (years neighborhood). 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1. Full sample 
We begin our analysis by describing the pooled data from the stage 1 decision across all 
treatments and participants. There, 32.8% of the sample contribute their full endowment either 
to the local (LPG) or the regional public good (RPG) and leave nothing in their private 
account. 6.1% of participants allocate their entire endowment to their private account. In line 
with the overwhelming evidence in PGG experiments, it is modal behavior to contribute 
some, but not all of the endowment to PGs. This can also be seen in Figure 3, which plots 
participants’ average contribution decisions to their private account and the LPG and RPG 
across all four treatment conditions.  
Before reporting on the first hypothesis test, we provide a first comparison between the 
behavior observed in our artefactual field experiment and that in previous laboratory studies. 
This comparison is based on the neutral treatment condition NOLABEL, which provides the 
closest parallel. The choice of parameters in the LOW MPCR treatment mirrors the baseline 
conditions in Blackwell and McKee (2003) and Fellner and Lünser (2014) in that 
contributions to the LPG and the RPG produce the same TB. Both lab studies find 
significantly higher contributions to the LPG than to the RPG. By contrast, we observe nearly 
                                                 
15 Table A1 in the supplementary material reports the descriptive statistics of the post-questionnaire broken down 
by municipal district. 
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equal average contributions to the LPG and the RPG (2.8 vs. 2.9). This could be due to 
differences between field and laboratory as well as other design differences such as group size 
(Blackwell and McKee 2003), and the level at which the MPCR is set (Blackwell and McKee 
2003, Fellner and Lünser 2014). 
 
Figure 3: Average contributions in the four treatment conditions, full sample  
 
Note: Average contributions to private, local and regional account in the NOLABEL (upper half) and LABEL (lower half) of 
LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the whole sample. Confidence intervals at the 95%-level.  
 
Hypothesis 1 conjectures that the artefactual field experiment will replicate a core finding of 
previous laboratory experiments, namely that a higher MPCR for the regional good causes 
significantly higher contributions by subjects. We test hypothesis 1 by comparing 
contributions to the RPG at different MPCRs in both the NOLABEL and the LABEL 
conditions. In the NOLABEL treatment, contributions to the RPG are significantly higher 
from an MPCR of 0.5 compared to an MPCR of 0.25 (2.9 vs. 4.6, p = 0.000, MW-U test). The 
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same is true in the LABEL treatment (2.8 vs. 4.4, p = 0.000, MW-U test).16 These tests are 
summarized in 
Result 1 (positive average MPCR effect): Average contributions to the regional public good 
are significantly higher in the HIGH MPCR treatment compared to the LOW MPCR 
treatment. 
We note in passing that the positive MPCR effect observed in this experiment is a substitution 
effect between the two PGs. The average share of endowment allocated to the private account 
does not change significantly across the MPCR conditions (NOLABEL: 2.3 vs. 2.1, p = 
0.309; LABEL: 2.3 vs. 2.1, p = 0.343, MW-U test). Average contributions to the LPG are 
significantly lower, however (NOLABEL: 2.8 vs. 1.3, p = 0.000; LABEL: 2.9 vs. 1.5, p = 
0.000, MW-U test). This observed substitution from the LPG to the RPG is well in line with 
the findings of Fellner and Lünser (2014), but contrasts with Blackwell and McKee (2003) 
who find that contributions are substituted from the private account towards the non-
excludable public good.17  
Having validated one of key findings from lab-based ML-PGG experiments in an artefactual 
field setting in result 1, we now turn to testing hypothesis 2, which forms the core of the 
paper. We expect that the strength of the MPCR effect will be significantly smaller in the 
LABEL condition, which invokes naturally occuring social identity, compared to the 
NOLABEL condition, which does not even invoke minimal group identity. The test of 
hypothesis 2 is essentially a difference-in-difference test in which we compare whether the 
MPCR effect (the difference between LOW and HIGH MPCR) differs between the 
NOLABEL and LABEL condition. In the NOLABEL condition, the MPCR effect gives rise 
to an increase of €1.8 in contributions to the RPG, in the LABEL condition to an increase of 
€1.6, which is smaller. The difference between the MPCR effects is not statistically 
significant, however (p = 0.766, F-test). Invoking social identity had therefore no significant 
effect on the average subject’s responsiveness to an increase in the MPCR of the RPG. This is 
summarized in  
Result 2 (‘leveling up’):  There is no statistical difference in the strengths of the MPCR effect 
in the social identity treatment conditions: The effect of revealing a shared social identity 
does not significantly change the increase in the contributions to the regional public good 
when its MPCR increases.  
                                                 
16 All statistically significant results reported are robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing proposed 
by List et al. (2016). 
17 As already noticed by Fellner and Lünser (2014), the results of Blackwell and McKee (2003) have to be interpreted with 
some caution as they are derived from only one independent observation per treatment.  
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The non-parametric test of hypothesis 2 is supported by regression analysis. Table 2 reports 
the results of a simple OLS model of participants’ contributions to either the private, local or 
regional account. The baseline are the contributions of subjects assigned to a treatment 
without social identity invoked (NOLABEL) and at an MPCR of 0.25 for the RPG (LOW). 
The dummy variable (LABEL) indicates assignment to treatment condition LABEL and the 
dummy variable HIGH assignment to a treatment with an MPCR of 0.5 for the RPG. The 
variable of interest is the interaction term of the two dummies (HIGH x LABEL), which 
captures whether contributions respond differently to a change in the MPCR when 
participants share a common local affiliation. We estimate both a simple model (first three 
columns of coefficients) as well as a richer model with further controls (second three 
columns). The controls comprise individual characteristics collected in the post-questionnaire: 
age, gender (female), income, years of education, the degree of religious affiliation (based on 
a five-point Likert scale from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘extremely’), the time of living in the 
respective neighborhood (neighborhood) and in the metropolitan region (region).  
 
Table 2: Individual contributions, full sample 
 qp ql qr qp ql qr 
 Private Local Regional Private Local Regional 
HIGH -0.27 -1.49*** 1.76*** 0.26 -1.61*** 1.87*** 
 (0.260) (0.212) (0.309) (0.263) (0.215) (0.311) 
LABEL -0.08 0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.241) (0.064) (0.282) (0.249) (0.252) (0.296) 
HIGH x LABEL 0.09 0.06 -0.16 0.08 0.22 -0.23 
 (0.367) (0.309) (0.444) (0.377) (0.317) (0.456) 
Constant 2.33*** 2.78*** 2.88*** 3.09*** 2.59*** 2.33*** 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.188) (0.606) (0.547) (0.736) 
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
       
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes 
       
# of observations 616 616 616 602 602 602 
Notes: OLS regressions, 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖[0,8]. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Controls: age, female, income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the 
metropolitan region. 
 
The regression results reaffirm results 1 and 2: The coefficients associated with the dummy 
variable HIGH show that at a higher MPCR, average contributions to the RPG are higher and 
contributions to the LPG lower, supporting result 1. Also note that the coefficients estimated 
for LABEL have the predicted sign (positive for the LPG, negative for the RPG), but are 
small and statistically insignificant for all three accounts. The dummy capturing the 
interaction effect is also insignificant throughout, supporting result 2 that there is no 
interaction effect. In the following, we challenge our findings by a series of robustness check 
18 
4.2. Robustness Check I: Pre-existing heterogeneity in place attachment 
The experimental procedures introduce two sources of heterogeneity in predisposition 
towards a local bias. One of the sources are pre-existing differences in place attachment: 
Some citizens identify much more with their own neighborhood than others. For subjects for 
whom place attachment is relatively unimportant for their social identity, revealing a shared 
local affiliation may not be sufficient to induce a change in contribution behavior. Subjects 
with strong place attachment, on the other hand, may respond more strongly than the average 
person to such information. This is important for two reasons: One is that there are spatial 
contexts in which neighborhood attachment is very prominent (such as sectarian cities with 
minimal intra-neighborhood mobility; see e.g. Meier et al. 2016). It is therefore useful to 
understand whether those for whom place attachment is an important component of social 
identity differ in their propensity to level up from the rest of the population. The other is that 
in real world settings in which contribution decisions to PG often have a sequential 
dimension, heterogeneity in the interaction effect could incite subjects with strong 
neighborhood attachment to be the first to contribute to the local PG, thus conceivably setting 
in motion a path towards parochialism that other participants subsequently follow (Vesterlund 
2003, Andreoni and Petrie 2004).  
To test for the possibility of a heterogeneous interaction effect, we first identify the subsample 
of subjects for whom place attachment is likely to matter most. This identification relies on a 
composite index that measures the degree of group identity based on five questions 
concerning participants’ affiliation with the neighborhood. Those above the median index 
value exhibit above-median place attachment.18 As a shorthand, we refer to this group as local 
patriots. Figure 4 plots the contribution behavior of local patriots in all four treatments.  
As a first construct validity test, we find that local patriots, i.e. those that express above-
median place attachment, exhibit a distinct contribution behavior. For example, local patriots 
contribute significantly more to the LPG than subjects with a below median place attachment, 
but only when a shared neighborhood affiliation in the small group is revealed (LABEL), 
irrespective of the MPCR condition (LOW: 3.3 vs. 2.5, p = 0.013; HIGH: 1.9 vs. 1.3, p = 
0.003, MW-U test). Unaware of the shared neighborhood in the small group (NOLABEL), 
their contribution behavior is indistinguishable from the rest of the sample (LOW: 2.5 vs. 3.0, 
                                                 
18 Place attachment is measured as the degree to which individuals agreed on a five-point likert scale from 1 ‘not 
at all’ to 5 ‘extremely’ to the following five items: ‘deliberately decided to live in their neighborhood’, ‘happy to 
live in their neighborhood’, ‘proud to live in their neighborhood’, ‘feel comfortable to live in their 
neighborhood’, and ‘perceive identification’ with their neighborhood each measured on a five-point likert scale 
from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘extremely’.  
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p = 0.176; HIGH: 1.3 vs. 1.3, p = 0.933; MW-U test).19 Local patriots therefore not only 
express above-median place attachment, they also contribute significantly more to the LPG 
than other subjects if and only if they know that the local group consists of neighbors.  
 
Figure 4: Average contributions in the four treatment conditions, subsample of subjects 
with above-median place attachment 
 
Note: Average contributions to private, local and regional account in the NOLABEL (upper half) and LABEL (lower half) of 
LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the sample restricted to local patriots. Confidence intervals at the 95%-level.  
  
In light of how local patriots’ contribution behavior differs from that of other subjects, the 
presence and nature of the MPCR effect and the presence of an interaction effect between 
MPCR and social identity information are obvious next questions. Hypothesis 3 predicts that 
this interaction effect will be present and, in light of result 2, significantly negative. To 
answer these questions, we first test for the MPCR effect by comparing in both social identity 
conditions the change in contributions to the RPG as the MPCR of the RPG doubles. 
Doubling the MPCR raises contributions to the RPG among local patriots by €1.7 (p = 0.000; 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with the observation that local patriots also respond more strongly and statistically 
significantly to the social identity treatment than others. Knowledge about a shared neighborhood in the small 
group makes local patriots increase their contributions to the LPG by 1.2 (LOW MPCR, p < 0.05) and by 0.6 
(HIGH MPCR, p < 0.10) relative to those without strong neighborhood attachment.   
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MW-U test) without knowledge of shared neighborhood (NOLABEL) and by €1.3 (p = 0.000; 
MW-U test) with knowledge of shared neighborhood (LABEL). This finding reaffirms 
result 1: Local patriots also exhibit the positive MPCR effect. Testing hypothesis 3 requires a 
comparison of the MPCR effects across social identity treatment. Table 3 reports the 
coefficients of the regression analysis conducted for the reduced sample. The results reaffirm 
the MPCR effect (dummy HIGH) as well as the positive impact of revealed shared 
neighborhood on contributions to the LPG. The interaction effect, however, does not deliver 
statistically significant results, leading us to reject hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 3: Individual contributions, local patriots 
 qp ql qr qp ql qr 
 Private Local Regional Private Local Regional 
HIGH -0.49 -1.25*** 1.74*** -0.43 -1.33*** 1.76*** 
 (0.398) (0.307) (0.472) 
 
(0. 399) 
 
(0. 318) 
 
(0.482) 
LABEL -0.42 0.75** -0.32 -0.45 0.77** -0.32 
 (0.341) (0.355) (0.416) (0.350) (0.377) (0.450) 
HIGH x LABEL 0.59 -0.19 -0.40 0.51 -0.14 -0.37 
 (0.530) (0.448) (0.646) (0.532) (0.474) (0.671) 
Constant 2.47*** 2.55*** 2.99*** 4.17*** 1.93*** 1.90*** 
 (0.261) (0.248) (0.299) (0.889) (0.779) (1.11) 
Controls no no no yes yes Yes 
       
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes Yes 
       
# of observations 302 302 302 294 294 294 
Notes: OLS regressions, 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖[0,8]. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Controls: age, female, income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the 
metropolitan region. 
 
Result 3 (leveling up by local patriots): For subjects with above-median place attachment, 
revelation of neighborhood ties does not result in less leveling up: There is no statistical 
difference in the strengths of the MPCR effect exhibited by subjects with strong place 
attachment across the social identity treatment conditions.  
Taken together, these findings have a number of implications. One is that the MPCR effect 
and the parochial bias affect contributions independently. ‘Local patriots’ behave more 
cooperatively towards others when they are aware that others are also locals and they respond 
to changes in the MPCR of a PG in the predicted way. However, their response to a change in 
the MPCR is not modulated by parochialism. Put differently, the parochialism observed in 
‘local patriots’, as evidenced in higher contributions to the LPG, is independent of how 
productive it is to provide the PG at a higher level. This independence, in turn, adds 
robustness to the sample average that is reported in result 2: Since the parochial bias of ‘local 
patriots’ does not interact with the MPCR effect, it is clear that result 2, the zero effect on 
21 
average, is not the outcome of countervailing effects among those with strong and those with 
weak place attachment.  
4.3. Robustness Check II: Priming for place attachment 
Despite relying on naturally occurring forms of social identity that are expected to affect 
behavior more substantially than minimal group identity, a conceivable objection to our 
experimental design could be a concern that it insufficiently stimulates an existing 
predisposition towards behaving parochially. If true, the results based on observed behavior in 
the social identity treatments LABEL/NOLABEL would underestimate the true effect of 
social identity. A robustness check based on pre-existing heterogeneity in place attachment, as 
that conducted in the previous subsection, would not provide a remedy if a social identity 
stimulus was indeed insufficient because the local patriots subsample is defined relative to the 
sample median rather than to an absolute benchmark.  
To examine whether result 2 is robust against the possibility of an insufficient experimental 
stimulus, we use observations from stage 2 of the experiment, i.e. after the priming task. A 
total of 454 subjects underwent the local priming version that is of interest here. As a first test, 
we compare the behavior between the LABEL and the NOLABEL treatment in stage 2 across 
the MPCR conditions. Figure 5 plots the stage 2 contribution decisions across treatments for 
all locally primed subjects. As in the previous tests, there is a strong MPCR effect on 
contributions to the RPG in the control group under the NOLABEL condition. Both size and 
significance of the effects are comparable to the previous results, reaffirming result 1.20 Also, 
priming has the expected effect on contribution behavior, providing a manipulation check on 
the priming procedure: Locally primed subjects in the LABEL treatment have significantly 
higher average contributions to the LPG than the control group both at a LOW MPCR (3.1 vs. 
2.5, p = 0.054, MWU test) and a HIGH MPCR (1.7 vs. 0.9, p = 0.001, MWU test).21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Contributions to the RPG increase significantly (2.7 vs. 4.5, p = 0.000) for a doubling of the MPCR while 
contributions to the LPG decrease significantly. (2.5 vs. 0.9, p = 0.000). 
21 While in LOW these additional contributions to the LPG accrue at the expense of lower contributions to both 
the private account (-0.3) and the RPG (-0.2), in HIGH we find additional contributions to the LPG primarily 
driven by lower contributions to the private account (-0.5) and a moderate decrease in RPG contributions (-0.2). 
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Figure 5: Average contributions across treatment conditions, stage 2, locally primed 
subjects  
Note: Average contributions to private, local and regional account in the NOLABEL | local prime (upper half) and 
LABEL | local prime (lower half) of LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the sample restricted to locally primed subjects. 
Confidence intervals at the 95%-level.  
 
Despite these effects, the interaction effect between an increase in the MPCR and invoking 
social identity is again insignificant. Table 4 reports the results of the regression analysis of 
the contributions decisions using the same estimation strategy as for tables 2 and 3. The 
results are similar to those for the restricted sample of stage 1 contributions by subjects with 
above-median place attachment presented in table 3. The coefficient estimates in table 4 
reaffirm a positive MPCR effect (dummy HIGH) that leads to a substitution away from LPG 
to RPG. The results in table 4 also confirm the presence of a pro-local bias induced by the 
revelation of shared neighborhood affiliation (dummy LABEL): Contributions to the LPG are 
higher. At the same time, table 4 also reaffirms the lack of an interaction effect: The change in 
contributions caused by a doubling of the MPCR in the RPG is statistically indistinguishable 
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between subjects primed for neighborhood attachment to whom a shared neighborhood 
affiliation in the local group is disclosed and primed subjects to whom it is not disclosed.  
 
Table 4: Individual contributions, full sample, after local prime 
 qp ql qr qp ql qr 
 Private Local Regional Private Local Regional 
HIGH -0.21 -1.56*** 1.77*** -0.28 -1.50*** 1.78*** 
 (0.383) (0.287) (0.416) (0.402) (0.303) (0.435) 
LABEL -0.31 0.57* -0.26 -0.34 0.59* -0.26 
 (0.328) (0.323) (0.343) (0.345) (0.342) (0.368) 
HIGH x LABEL -0.18 0.14 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.15 
 (0.472) (0.378) (0.528) (0.495) (0.396) (0.554) 
Constant 2.78*** 2.50*** 2.72*** 3.15*** 1.93*** 2.92*** 
 (0.261) (0.255) (0.277) (0.756) (0.646) (0.911) 
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
       
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes 
       
# of observations 454 454 454 443 443 443 
Notes: OLS regressions, 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖[0,8]. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Controls: age, female, income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the 
metropolitan region. 
 
As a second test, we rerun the regression on a restricted sample of 238 subjects that were 
allocated to the same social identity condition in both stages. This eliminates a potential 
attenuation of the treatment effects in the NOLABEL treatment in stage 2 by subjects who 
were assigned to the LABEL treatment in stage 1 and were therefore aware of the 
composition of the small group.  
 
Table 5: Individual contributions, restricted sample, after local prime 
 qp ql qr qp ql qr 
 Private Local Regional Private Local Regional 
HIGH -0.02 -1.99*** 2.00*** -0.00 -2.06*** 2.06*** 
 (0.524) (0.441) (0.558) (0.565) (0.485) (0.589) 
LABEL -0.04 0.33 -0.28 0.04 0.27 -0.32 
 (0.465) 
 
(0.490) (0.471) (0.510) (0.530) (0.512) 
HIGH x LABEL -0.44 0.31 0.13 -0.52 0.30 0.23 
 (0.663) (0.561) (0.724) (0.727) (0.617) (0.790) 
Constant 2.58*** 2.98*** 2.44*** 3.51*** 2.41*** 2.08* 
 (0.359) (0.399) (0.380) (1.09) (0.930) (1.22) 
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
       
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes 
       
# of observations 229 229 229 225 225 225 
Notes: OLS regressions, 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 , 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖[0,8]. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Controls: age, female, income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the 
metropolitan region. 
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Table 5 reports the results of this exercise, which are in line with the evidence from the full 
sample.22 Jointly, these tests of the effect of the local priming procedure on contributions 
leads to our final result.  
Result 4 (no interaction effect through priming): There is no statistical difference in the 
strengths of the MPCR effect exhibited by subjects primed for place attachment across the 
social identity treatment conditions.  
This result also supports the previous finding that the MPCR and the social identity effects are 
unrelated, even when the propensity for place attachment is procedurally activated through a 
priming task. 
5. Conclusion 
The starting point of this paper was the question whether naturally grown social identity, a 
well established source of biases in other-regarding behavior, also negatively affects the 
efficiency of multi-level public goods provision due to parochial concerns. Building on the 
experimental paradigm of the multi-level public goods game and the well-established concept 
of neighborhood attachment, it tests whether subjects who know that their contributions to the 
lower level public good specifically benefit their neighbors respond less to a higher MPCR in 
the higher level public good than subjects who are unaware of the shared neighborhood 
attachment.  
Our evidence from an artefactual field experiment design brings three novel elements to bear 
on the question. One element is the field context that favors naturally grown social identity as 
a behavioral driver of parochial concerns. The second element is the particular neighborhood-
within-a-region setting that allows parochialism to naturally assert itself at the local level. The 
third is a two-by-two design that both varies the public good’s productivity across levels and 
the salience of social identity. This two-by-two design makes disentangling both dimensions 
in a formal test possible. Jointly, these elements confirm previous evidence that there is a 
positive MPCR effect in multi-level public goods, but also that level-wise allocations of 
public goods contributions do not efficiently respond to relative total productivities. Our 
results also show, however, that inefficiencies of level-wise allocations need not reflect 
parochialism. Most importantly, they challenge the hypothesis that a shared social identity in 
the smaller group makes the average subject less responsive to a higher efficiency of 
contributing to the larger group. Parochialism, in other words, does not stand in the way of 
                                                 
22 Additional tests on other subsamples in which the first stage treatment assignment are taken into account in 
various ways were also conducted. These tests reaffirm the results reported in the main text.  
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efficiency. This result is robust towards individual heterogeneity in social identity as it holds 
for subjects with above-median neighborhood attachment and subjects primed towards such 
attachment, even though both groups exhibit clear evidence of parochialism.  
In sum, therefore, we find that even naturally grown types of social identity do not necessarily 
imply a parochialism penalty on efficiency in a situation in which public goods can be 
provided at more than one spatial level.23   
                                                 
23 Note that we are not claiming that the private provision of public goods will be efficient, which would run 
counter to an overwhelming body of empirical and experimental evidence. We are only claiming that social 
identity will not increase the inefficiencies inherent in the social dilemma of PG provision.  
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Table A1: Sample characteristics 
 Total Heidelberg Mannheim 
  Bahnstadt Neuenheim Feudenheim Schwetzingerstadt / Oststadt 
Subjects (in #) 616 146 177 109 184 
Age (in years) 35.6 29.0 38.1 47.2 31.5 
Female (in %) 45.7 47.9 48.9 42.6 42.6 
Income (in EUR) 2,087 2,027 2,117 2,550 1,832 
Education (in years) 14.8 14.4 15.4 14.3 15.0 
Religion 2.33 2.33 2.31 2.43 2.30 
Region (in years) 17.5 7.4 19.5 35.2 13.2 
Neighborhood (in years) 8.9 1.6 10.8 20.6 5.9 
Local Identity Index -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.29 -0.16 
Local Patriots (in %) 49 45 47 65 44 
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Invitation letter (translated from German) 
 
 
 
 
 
 – Invitation – 
June 2015 
 
Invitation to participate in a scientific study 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
The University of Heidelberg and the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
Mannheim are jointly carrying out a scientific study on individual choice behaviour. This 
research project is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.  
Your household has been chosen randomly to actively support our research project by 
participating in a 15-minute online survey. You will receive a reward of 5 euros for 
your participation in any case. The choices you will make in the online survey will 
further increase the amount of money.  
No special previous knowledge is required. Please note that only one person per household 
can participate in this study and this person needs to have attained full age. 
You may immediately start with the online survey. To do so, please, register at the following 
website: 
www.zew.de/umfrage2015 
Your personal access key (valid until 28.06.2015) is:  <<CODE>> 
Please, contact Dr Daniel Römer if you have any questions by calling 0621/1235-214 or send 
an email to umfrage@zew.de. For further information, please, refer to the back of the 
page. 
We are looking forward to your participation in this survey that surely is also of interest to 
you, and thank you very much for supporting this research project. 
 
 
 
Prof Timo Goeschl, Ph.D. 
Research Centre for Environmental Economics 
Alfred Weber Institute of Economics 
University of Heidelberg 
 Dr Daniel Römer  
Environmental and Resource Economics,  
Environmental Management 
Centre for European Economic Research  
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Information sheet on content and procedure of the study 
 
Who is organising this study? 
This study is part of a joint research project of the University of Heidelberg and the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. The University of Heidelberg is a 
public institute for education and research of the federal state Baden-Wuerttemberg. The 
ZEW is a non-profit research institute and member of the Leibniz Association. This 
research project is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
 
How can I participate? 
You may participate starting from today until at the latest 28.06.2015 (as long as the 
maximum number of participants has not been reached). You only need a device (e.g. 
computer, laptop, tablet or smartphone) with internet access and internet browser (e.g. 
Internet Explorer, Firefox, Safari, Chrome). 
• Computer/laptop: To register, please, enter www.zew.de/umfrage2015 into the 
address bar of your internet browser. It leads you to the start screen where you 
need to enter your personal access key. The access key is on the first page of the 
invitation letter. This access key allows you to participate in the study one time 
only. The online survey starts immediately after you have entered the key. 
 
• Tablet/smartphone: To register, please, enter www.zew.de/umfrage2015 into the 
address bar of your internet browser. Alternatively, you may also use an adequate 
app to read the QR code beside this paragraph. Both options lead you to the start 
screen where you need to enter your personal access key. The access key is on the 
first page of the invitation letter. This access key allows you to participate in the 
study one time only. The online survey starts immediately after you have entered 
the key. 
 
What about my data? 
The information you give is exclusively used for research purposes and analysed 
anonymously. Your personal data are exclusively used to transfer your reward to you and 
are neither related to the information given in the survey nor given to any third-party. 
What influences the amount of reward I will receive? 
Your reward consists of a standard reward and an additional reward. In any case, you will 
receive the standard reward of 5 euros for participating. The amount of the additional 
reward depends on your own choices and those of the other participants.  
How will I receive my reward? 
We want to transfer your reward to you without you having to give us your bank data. 
Therefore, you will receive a shopping voucher by mail about 4 weeks after 
participating. The value of the voucher equals the total amount of your reward (standard 
reward of 5 euros plus additional reward). You may use the voucher in many different 
local stores and online shops to pay for your shopping (e. g. Galeria Kaufhof, Karstadt, 
Media Markt, Saturn – for the complete list of stores accepting the voucher, please, refer 
to this website: http://www.edenred.de/produkte/ticket-shopping-
card/akzeptanzpartner.html) 
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Instructions and Questionnaire (translated from German) 
Explanation: Please note that the square brackets [] indicate an alternative version of the 
different treatments and the label/no-label framing, respectively. The term city district (set in 
italics) stands for one of the four different municipal districts Bahnstadt, Feudenheim, 
Neuenheim, and Schwetzingerstadt/Oststadt, depending on where the respective participant is 
located.  
-Screen 1- 
Welcome to our research study! 
Dear participant, 
Thank you for showing your interest in this research study. You can start with the tasks 
immediately. Here you can find the most important information regarding your participation: 
• The participation takes on average 15 minutes.  
• It includes two tasks and questionnaires. 
• All tasks will be precisely explained to you in the course of the study.  
• All explanations are carried out as described:  
o By “money” we mean real amounts of money which will be paid out 
definitely.  
o By “other participants” we mean real people who participate in this study just 
like you. 
Note: Please always use the provided buttons and not your internet browser for navigation 
because otherwise a successful completion of the survey is not guaranteed.  
-Screen 2- 
Your expense allowance consists of two parts: 
In any case, you will receive a lump sum amounting to 5 Euros if you complete both tasks and 
completely fill out the questionnaires.  
• In task 1 or task 2, additional payments will arise for you and the other study 
participants. 
• A random procedure (comparable with a coin flip) at the end of the study will 
determine whether you receive the payment from either task 1 or task 2. Both are 
equally probable. 
• We will definitely choose and pay out one of the two payments. You will receive the 
respective payment additionally to the lump sum. 
Thus, your total payment for participating in the study consists of the following:  
Your total payment = 5 Euros + payment of either task 1 or task 2  
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-Screen 3- 
On the next screen, the first decision task starts. Please carefully read through the following 
explanations as it describes how your payment and the payments of the other study 
participants are dependent on your decision.  
-Screen 4- 
Explanation and procedure of task 1  
In this section, you can earn money additionally to the lump sum.  
Who are the other participants?  
All in all, 8 attendees participate in this decision task, namely you and 7 more participants. 
[Apart from you, 3 other participants are inhabitants of city district. The other 4 participants 
are not inhabitants of city district but of another area located in the Rhine-Neckar 
Metropolitan Region.] 
What is your task? 
In this task, you and all other participants are provided with 8 Euros at your free disposal. 
Please note that you receive this amount of money in addition to the lump sum. Your task is to 
decide on how to distribute the 8 Euros to three different pots. It is important to know that the 
whole amount of 8 Euros has to be distributed completely to the three different pots. Please 
note that the other participants face the same situation of decision-making as you do.  
How do the pots differ from each other? 
At the end of the study, the total sum of the amounts of money from all three pots are paid out 
to you and to the other participants according to the rules explained below. It depends on the 
pot (A, B, or C) if either you, or you and 3 other participants, or you and 7 other participants 
benefit from the payment. In addition, the total sum of certain pots is multiplied before 
receiving any payment.  
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every Euro that is 
put into this pot, you will receive 1 Euro. The 7 other participants do not receive any 
payment from your pot. However, every participant equally owns a respective pot A.  
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): Apart from you, there are 3 more participants [from 
city district] (in total 4 participants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every 
Euro which is put into this pot will be doubled and the respective sum will be equally 
distributed to all 4 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot B, you and the 3 other 
participants will consequently receive 0.50 Euros each. The other group, which also 
comprises 4 participants, will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other 
group also owns a respective Pot B.  
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]): Apart from you, there are 7 
other participants [from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] (in total 8 participants) who 
can put an amount of money into this pot. Every Euro which is put into this pot will be 
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doubled [quadrupled] and the respective sum will be equally [unequally] distributed to all 
8 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 7 other participants [from the 
Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] will consequently receive 0.25 Euros [0.50 Euros] each. 
[For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 3 other participants with whom you also 
share Pot B will receive 0.25 Euros [0.75) each. In return, the 4 participants of the opposite 
group, who also own a respective Pot B, receive 0.75 Euros [0.25] each.] 
If task 1 is chosen for payment, your total payment is composed of the following elements: 
Total payment = 5 Euro (lump sum) + 1.0 x (sum of Euros of Pot A) + 0.5 x (sum of Euros of 
Pot B) + 0.25 [0.50, 0.75] x (sum of Euros of Pot C)  
-Screen 5-  
Please enter the amount of money you want to put into the three pots. Please remember that 
you are provided with 8 Euros at your free disposal for this task of decision-making and you 
can decide on how to distribute this amount of money to the three different pots. For this 
purpose, please fill in the gaps by entering an amount between 0 and 8 Euros. 
Pot A (private): ___€ 
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): ___€ 
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]):___€ 
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every Euro that is 
put into this pot, you will receive 1 Euro. The 7 other participants do not receive any 
payment from your pot. However, every participant equally owns a respective pot A.  
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): Apart from you, there are 3 more participants [from 
city district] (in total 4 participants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every 
Euro which is put into this pot will be doubled and the respective sum will be equally 
distributed to all 4 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot B, you and the 3 other 
participants will consequently receive 0.50 Euros each. The other group, which also 
comprises 4 participants, will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other 
group also owns a respective Pot B.  
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]): Apart from you, there are 7 
other participants [from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] (in total 8 participants) who 
can put an amount of money into this pot. Every Euro which is put into this pot will be 
doubled [quadrupled] and the respective sum will be equally [unequally] distributed to all 
8 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 7 other participants [from the 
Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] will consequently receive 0.25 Euros [0.50 Euros] each. 
[For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 3 other participants with whom you also 
share Pot B will receive 0.25 Euros [0.75) each. In return, the 4 participants of the opposite 
group, who also own a respective Pot B, receive 0.75 Euros [0.25] each.] 
-Screen 6-  
Before proceeding with task 2, we would like to gather some information about your district.  
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-Screen 7-  
 
Now we would like you to answer the following questions.  
------------- 
1. How strongly do you identify yourself with the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region?  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
 
------------- 
2. How strongly do you identify yourself with the district of city district?  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
 
 
-Screen 8-  
 
Now we would like you to answer the following questions.  
1. Please indicate how much you, as an inhabitant of city district, agree with the following 
statements.  
------------- 
a) I deliberately decided to live in city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------ 
b) I actively participate in local organizations and groups which mainly consist of members 
who are inhabitants of city district. 
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
c) I am happy to live in city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
d) I participate in neighborhood activities together with other inhabitants of city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
e) Recently, many new inhabitants have moved to city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
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2. Please describe the positive aspects of city district [of the region] briefly in your own 
words. 
Answer _________________________ 
-Screen 9-  
On the next screen, the second decision task starts. Please carefully read through the 
following explanations as it describes how your payment and the payments of the other study 
participants are dependent on your decision.  
-Screen 10-  
Explanation and procedure of task 2 
In this part of the study, you can also earn money additionally to your lump sum. Regarding 
the procedure, the second task is similar to the first task. The only difference is that the 
participants form new groups in the second task. 
Who are the other participants? 
All in all, 8 attendees participate in this decision task, namely you and 7 more participants. 
These 7 participants are not the same persons as in task 1 since the groups were newly 
formed for task 2. [Apart from you, 3 other participants are inhabitants of city district. The 
other 4 participants are not inhabitants of city district but of another area located in the Rhine-
Neckar Metropolitan Region.] 
What is your task? 
In this task, you and all other participants are provided with 8 Euros at your free disposal. 
Please note that you receive this amount of money in addition to the lump sum. Your task is to 
decide on how to distribute the 8 Euros to three different pots. It is important to know that the 
whole amount of 8 Euros has to be distributed completely to the three different pots. Please 
note that the other participants face the same situation of decision-making as you do.  
How do the pots differ from each other? 
At the end of the study, the total sum of the amounts of money from all three pots are paid out 
to you and to the other participants according to the rules explained below. It depends on the 
pot (A, B, or C) if either you, or you and 3 other participants, or you and 7 other participants 
benefit from the payment. In addition, the total sum of certain pots is multiplied before 
receiving any payment.  
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every Euro that is 
put into this pot, you will receive 1 Euro. The 7 other participants do not receive any 
payment from your pot. However, every participant equally owns a respective pot A.  
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): Apart from you, there are 3 more participants [from 
city district] (in total 4 participants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every 
Euro which is put into this pot will be doubled and the respective sum will be equally 
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distributed to all 4 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot B, you and the 3 other 
participants will consequently receive 0.50 Euros each. The other group, which also 
comprises 4 participants, will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other 
group also owns a respective Pot B.  
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]): Apart from you, there are 7 
other participants [from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] (in total 8 participants) who 
can put an amount of money into this pot. Every Euro which is put into this pot will be 
doubled [quadrupled] and the respective sum will be equally [unequally] distributed to all 
8 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 7 other participants [from the 
Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] will consequently receive 0.25 Euros [0.50 Euros] each. 
[For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 3 other participants with whom you also 
share Pot B will receive 0.25 Euros [0.75) each. In return, the 4 participants of the opposite 
group, who also own a respective Pot B, receive 0.75 Euros [0.25] each.] 
If task 1 is chosen for payment, your total payment is composed of the following elements: 
Total payment = 5 Euro (lump sum) + 1.0 x (sum of Euros of Pot A) + 0.5 x (sum of Euros of 
Pot B) + 0.25 [0.50, 0.75] x (sum of Euros of Pot C)  
 
-Screen 11-  
Please enter the amount of money you want to put into the three pots. Please remember that 
you are provided with 8 Euros at your free disposal for this task of decision-making and you 
can decide on how to distribute this amount of money to the three different pots. For this 
purpose, please fill in the gaps by entering an amount between 0 and 8 Euros. 
Pot A (private): ___€ 
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): ___€ 
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]):___€ 
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every Euro that is 
put into this pot, you will receive 1 Euro. The 7 other participants do not receive any 
payment from your pot. However, every participant equally owns a respective pot A.  
Pot B (4 participants [city district]): Apart from you, there are 3 more participants [from 
city district] (in total 4 participants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every 
Euro which is put into this pot will be doubled and the respective sum will be equally 
distributed to all 4 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot B, you and the 3 other 
participants will consequently receive 0.50 Euros each. The other group, which also 
comprises 4 participants, will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other 
group also owns a respective Pot B.  
Pot C (8 participants [Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region]): Apart from you, there are 7 
other participants [from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] (in total 8 participants) who 
can put an amount of money into this pot. Every Euro which is put into this pot will be 
doubled [quadrupled] and the respective sum will be equally [unequally] distributed to all 
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8 participants. For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 7 other participants [from the 
Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region] will consequently receive 0.25 Euros [0.50 Euros] each. 
[For every Euro that is put into Pot C, you and the 3 other participants with whom you also 
share Pot B will receive 0.25 Euros [0.75) each. In return, the 4 participants of the opposite 
group, who also own a respective Pot B, receive 0.75 Euros [0.25] each.] 
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After having made your decisions, we are interested in how you assess the behavior of the 
other participants in task 2. 
------------- 
1. Regardless of your own decision: In your opinion, which decision did the other participants 
from city district make on average when they had to face the same situation of decision-
making as you did? 
Pot A: ___€  Pot B:___€ Pot C: ___€ 
------------- 
2. Regardless of your own decision:  In your opinion, which decision did the other 
participants from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region make on average when they had to 
face the same situation of decision-making as you did? 
Pot A: ___€  Pot B: ___€ Pot C: ___€ 
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Now we would like to know your opinion about the comprehensibility of the tasks. 
------------- 
1. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: The instructions for the 
tasks were clearly explained.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
 
------------- 
2. Regardless of your actual decision: How would you have distributed the 8 Euros to Pot A, 
Pot B and Pot C in task 2 if it had been your aim to maximize the expense allowance for 
yourself?  
Pot A: ___€  Pot B: ___€ Pot C: ___€ 
------------- 
3. Regardless of your actual decision: How would you have distributed the 8 Euros to Pot A, 
Pot B and Pot C in task 2 if it had been your aim to maximize the expense allowance for all 8 
participants in the decision task?  
Pot A: ___€  Pot B: ___€ Pot C: ___€ 
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Thank you very much, you are almost done. Finally, we would like to ask you for some 
personal details.  
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Now we would like you to answer the following questions.  
------------- 
1. Please indicate how much you, as an inhabitant of the city district, agree with the following 
statements.  
------------- 
a) I am proud to live in the district of city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
b) I feel comfortable in the district of city district.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
2. Self-assessment of your personality: In general, are you a person willing to take risks or are 
you more risk-averse? 
Explanation about the scale: 0 (risk-averse) to 5 (prepared to take risks) 
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  0   1   2   3   4   5   No 
statement 
------------- 
3. What is your opinion about the following three statements? 
a) In general, people can be trusted.   
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
  Disagree   Agree   Strongly 
Agree 
  No statement 
------------- 
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b) Nowadays people are not reliable anymore.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
  Disagree   Agree   Strongly 
Agree 
  No statement 
------------- 
c) In dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them.  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
  Disagree   Agree   Strongly 
Agree 
  No statement 
------------- 
4. Do you think that most people…  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  … would take advantage of you if they had the possibility to do so… 
  …or would rather try to be fair to you? 
  No statement 
------------- 
5. In your opinion, would you say that most of the time people...  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  … try to be helpful… 
  …or only pursue their own interests? 
  No statement 
------------- 
6. Please specify your gender:  
Please choose one of the following answers:  
 
  Male 
  Female 
------------- 
7. How old are you? ______ years  
------------- 
8. How long have you been living in the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region?  
For approximately ___________years  
------------- 
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9. How long have you been living in the district of city district?  
For approximately _______________ years 
------------- 
10. Do you consider yourself a member of a certain religious community?   
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Not at all   Slightly   Moderately   Very   Extremely   No statement 
------------- 
11. What are your native languages? _______________________ 
------------- 
12. In total, how much money does your household have at its disposal (net income) per 
month?  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  Up to 
less than 
500€ 
  500€ 
to 
1,000€ 
  1,000€ 
to 
1,500€ 
  1,500€ to 
2,000€ 
  2,000€ 
to 
3,000€ 
  3,000 to 
4,000€ 
  4,000€ 
or more 
  No 
statemen
t 
------------- 
13. Which party would you vote for if there were parliamentary elections to be held next 
Sunday?  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  CDU/CSU   FDP   I do not vote 
  SPD   Die Linke   No statement 
  Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen 
  AfD   Other: 
_______________________ 
 
 
------------- 
14. What is the highest level of education you have received?  
Please choose one of the following answers: 
 
  No qualification 
  Hauptschule (Secondary School Leaving Certificate)  
  Mittlere Reife (O level) 
  Fachhochschulreife (Advanced Technical College Certificate) 
  Abitur (A level / Higher Education Entrance Qualification) 
  Completed apprenticeship 
  University Diploma / Polytechnic Degree  
  No statement 
  Other qualification: __________________________ 
 
43 
-Screen 16-  
You will definitely receive 5 Euros for your participation. For the additional payment, there 
will be a procedure (comparable with a coin flip) which randomly selects whether you will 
receive the additional payment either from task 1 or task 2. Both outcomes are equally 
probable. We definitely choose and pay one of the two payments. You will receive the 
respective payment additionally to the lump sum.  
Your total payment = 5 Euros + payment from either task 1 or task 2  
As soon as all participants have made their decisions, we will inform you about the resulting 
total payment. 
------------- 
In order to enable you to receive your earned compensation without having to provide your 
personal bank data, you will receive a shopping voucher by mail approximately 4 weeks after 
your participation. The value of the voucher corresponds to your total payment. You can use 
the voucher to cover the costs of your purchase in numerous local shops and online shops 
(e.g. Galeria Kaufhof, Karstadt, Media Markt, Saturn). 
------------- 
For this purpose, please enter your address: 
Note: Your address will be used only for sending the shopping voucher and will not be 
transferred to third parties. Moreover, the data of the questionnaires will not be linked to your 
address data. If you have any questions concerning this research procedure, please do not 
hesitate to contact the directors of the study by calling 0621/1235-214 or by email 
(umfrage@zew.de). 
Name:  _________________________ 
Surname: _________________________ 
Street Address: _________________________ 
Zip Code: _________________________ 
City:   _________________________ 
 
------------- 
Did you enjoy taking part in this study and do you want to participate in other scientific 
studies of this type?  
We would be pleased to add your name to our member database and would be happy to invite 
you to further studies. For this purpose, we only need your e-mail address. As a matter of 
course, your e-mail address is not used for any other purposes and if you wish to withdraw 
your participation offer at any point, your data will be directly unsubscribed from the 
database.  
E-mail Address:  _________________________ 
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Thank you very much! 
Your answers were stored. 
